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Who Owns the Rules of War?
The war in Iraq demands a rethinking of the international rules of conduct.
The outcome could mean less power for neutral, well-meaning human rights
Groups and more for big-stick-wielding states. That would be a good thing.
By Kenneth Anderson
The New York Times Magazine
(Sunday, April 13, 2003, pp. 38-43)
During the euphoria of the opening air campaign against Baghdad, commentary was
filled with triumphal rhetoric about hitting ''legitimate military objectives'' while
causing little or even no loss of civilian life. A week ago, the air war was pounding
more than symbols of the regime, and the ground war had become a real war.
Scarcely a speech, briefing or interview was being given that failed to mention the
laws of war. The Iraqi regime, for its part, was broadcasting denunciations of
American airstrikes replete with images of corpses and wounded civilians in
hospitals; the United States responded that Iraq had systematically situated military
targets and equipment in the midst of civilian areas. The sheer frequency of these
references on all sides belied the ancient maxim inter arma silent leges -- in time of
war law is silent.
People throughout the world obviously care about what is called jus in bello, law
governing conduct during war. This is so even if they differ about jus ad bellum, law
governing not the conduct of war but rather the resort to force itself. But even while
there is agreement on the need for fundamental rules governing the conduct of war,
there is profound disagreement over who has authority to declare, interpret and
enforce those rules, as well as who -- and what developments in the so-called art of
war -- will shape them now and into the future. In short, who ''owns'' the law of war?
Although most of the world's religious and ethical traditions, if they admit the moral
possibility of war at all, say something about what conduct is permitted in war,
modern law of war descended historically as a tenet of traditional Christian just-war
theory. The practical expression of such law, however, began with the founding of the
International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863. The moving force behind the
establishment of the Red Cross was Henri Dunant, a Genevan who witnessed and later
wrote a widely read account of the Battle of Solferino in the 1859 war between
Austria and France. Dunant, together with inhabitants of a village near the battlefield,
went about the appalling task of trying to tend to the thousands of wounded who had
simply been left to die. Without bandages, stretchers, doctors or medicines, and above
all without significant interest in the wounded by their governments, there was little to
be done except offer water and prayer. In the aftermath, the Red Cross, organized to
do what had not been done at Solferino, became the world's first secular international
nongovernmental organization, the ur-N.G.O. One of its goals was self-contradictory
and even ludicrous on its face -- to bring humanity to the battlefield -- but its idealism

1

was expressive of a sweeping call for reform among the middle classes in late-19thcentury Europe and America, where an indigenous humanitarian movement for the
care of soldiers had taken root during the Civil War.
In Europe, the same spirit of reform touched governments and royal courts, as a series
of diplomatic conferences set about codifying the centuries-long tradition of ''laws and
customs of war.'' The most important result was the 1907 Hague Convention, which in
56 short articles covers vast legal terrain on the conduct of warfare -- including
surrender and flags of truce, obligations to wear uniforms, treatment of prisoners of
war, sieges and bombardments, protection of cultural property, prohibitions against
pillage and terms of occupation.
Its general rules are still applicable, at least in principle, today. Indeed, most of the
matters that coalition forces raise as violations of the laws of war by Iraqi forces -perfidious surrender, fighting out of uniform or mistreatment of P.O.W.'s -- can be
found somewhere in the Hague regulations.
Optimism was swept away a few years later, however, by the guns of August. During
World War I, in which mustard gas, aerial warfare, tanks and, above all, the machine
gun, were introduced, old rules were clearly no longer enough, and existing
humanitarian organizations were simply unable to cope with suffering on a scale
never before seen. Following the Great War, there was a resurgence of interest in the
fields of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The Red Cross built on its earlier work in
fostering treaties for sick and wounded soldiers and moved directly into promoting
humanitarianism in war through legal rules, convening meetings between states that
eventually resulted in the Geneva Conventions of 1929. These conventions, along
with the 1907 Hague Convention, were the primary codified laws of war in effect
when World War II broke out. In addition, states negotiated the 1925 Geneva Protocol
prohibiting gas weapons -- a ban that held with few exceptions, even during World
War II, for 60 years, until Saddam Hussein broke it in the Iran-Iraq war and again in
his genocidal 1988 Anfal campaign against the Kurds.
World War II brought its own violations, partly owing to the new technology of air
war against civilians. The carpet bombing of Dresden, for instance, inevitably swept
civilians in with soldiers as targets. The conclusion of World War II brought about
two signal developments in the laws of war. The first was the holding of criminal
trials by the victors of those deemed to be chiefly responsible for the war. We tend to
think of the Nuremberg trials as war-crimes trials, but in fact Nuremberg was
principally about trying German leaders for the crime of aggressive war, for making
war itself, crimes of jus ad bellum, rather than for the manner of its conduct. The chief
American prosecutor, Robert Jackson, was content to leave what he regarded as the
legally less-cutting-edge matters, the war's atrocities, to prosecutors from other
countries.
Jackson's seeming triumph at Nuremberg, however -- establishing that international
judges could try and convict a nation's leaders for the crime of aggression -- did not
survive the establishment of the United Nations and the Security Council. The matter
of determining aggression and maintaining international peace was stripped from
international jurists and thrust into the hands of the permanent members of the
Security Council, victors of World War II.
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Of course, the Security Council, far from maintaining peace and security, has served
as little more than a talking shop for nearly all of its history. The willingness of one of
the permanent five members to brush off the Security Council when its core national
interests are threatened -- as the United States and Britain just did with respect to Iraq
-- is a norm of the Security Council, not a departure from it. Every permanent member
has such interests, which are not necessarily even questions of national security but
are frequently matters of ambition or even sentimental attachment. They include Tibet
and Taiwan for the Chinese; Chechnya and, in 1999, Serbia for the Russians; and
Francophone Africa for the French.
The enduring law established at Nuremberg has thus turned out not to be the ''crime of
aggression'' but a reaffirmation of war crimes as traditionally understood -- with two
important innovations made necessary by the Nazi death camps: genocide and crimes
against humanity. Nuremberg also had serious gaps. Most significant, it failed to
address the terror bombing of civilians and the deliberate consuming of whole cities
(Dresden, Tokyo) by fire -- the most enthusiastic practitioners of the latter being the
Allies.
The failure to prosecute the Allies for firebombing cities is one of the strongest
arguments today for why war-crimes tribunals should not be conducted by the victors.
Many regard this argument as so clinching, in fact, that the mere charge of ''victor's
justice'' is enough to end debate. Yet it is far from obvious to me that ''impartial,''
uninvolved parties automatically carry greater moral authority than victors. Would it
have been morally better, for example, for the victors of World War II, who had paid
the price in blood, to have handed justice over to those countries that had remained
neutral and refused to become involved? What matters far more than the supposedly
virtuous impartiality that comes from neutrality is the quality of justice served in each
case.
Another development in the laws of war following World War II was the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 -- the first covering wounded or sick soldiers; the second,
shipwrecked sailors; the third, prisoners of war; and the fourth, civilians and
occupation. The Geneva Conventions also introduced, for the first time in the
canonical laws-of-war treaties, individual criminal liability and mandatory ''universal
jurisdiction'' -- the ability (indeed, the obligation) of any and every state to try
individuals (or turn them over to a state that would) whenever there was evidence of
''grave breaches'' of the Geneva Conventions.
The question of who is qualified to assert jurisdiction and then judge cases of war
crimes is vital to determining who owns the laws of war. Universal jurisdiction says,
in effect, lots of people own the laws -- but it leaves open the possibility of widely
differing interpretations. A case in point is the continuing argument over whether the
detainees at Guantanamo are indeed bona fide P.O.W.'s being mistreated under the
Third Geneva Convention, as Amnesty International argues; or whether the Taliban
among them are P.O.W.'s but some members of Al Qaeda are not, as Human Rights
Watch says; or whether none of them are P.O.W.'s at all, as the Bush administration
insists. Related to this is the question of whether detainees can be determined not to
be P.O.W.'s by any means other than individual hearings. Many human rights
advocates simply assume that the determination of whether a detainee is a P.O.W.
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must be reached by an individual hearing. This is a reading of the treaty with which
even many conservatives agree. (Indeed, it is the reading presumed in 1997 United
States military regulations that long precede Sept. 11.) But while it is surely the best
interpretation of the Third Geneva Convention, it is not necessarily the way a literal
reader would interpret phrases in Article 5's language like ''competent tribunal'' and
''should any doubt arise.'' It is (barely, but literally) available to the Bush
administration to maintain that a) no doubt arises as to the status of the prisoners at
Guantanamo and that b) the determination of whether any doubt has arisen does not
necessarily require a hearing by a ''competent tribunal'' but merely a finding by the
secretary of defense or the president.
This apparently esoteric legal issue, seemingly nothing but sheer technicality, is
important. Why? It is not because it prevents someone from being charged with war
crimes -- anyone can be charged with war crimes -- but because those determined not
to be bona fide P.O.W.'s have far fewer procedural rights at trial. Bona fide P.O.W.'s
(even those charged with war crimes) must be given the same legal protections at trial
that an American soldier, accused of the same crime, would be given (and these are
considerable), whereas an ''unprivileged combatant'' receives only minimal due
process protections. The issue is about to arise again, this time in connection with
Iraq's fedayeen militia fighters, who wear no uniforms and therefore might not qualify
as bona fide P.O.W.'s, some of whom may be transferred shortly to Guantanamo.
This dispute points, in addition, to an unsettling feature about the struggle over who
''owns'' the law of war. The various constituencies that believe it belongs to them -- in
this case, the United States government on the one side and human rights
organizations on the other -- feel little obligation to acknowledge frankly the
arguments made against their legal interpretations.
Despite these struggles over authority to interpret the 1949 Geneva Conventions, they
are accepted universally as binding law on the treatment of people under a particular
status -- soldier, sailor, P.O.W., civilian. The fundamental moral and legal principles
are plain. First, noncombatants may never be made the object or target of attack, nor
may noncombatants ever be used by defenders to shield legitimate military objectives
from attack. Second, military operations, whether by attackers or defenders, must be
undertaken with care to distinguish between noncombatants and combatants.
Moreover, military officials must refrain from operations likely to produce collateral
civilian damage that is excessive relative to the military advantages. So, for example,
if the Iraqi Republican Guard has based itself in a crowded Baghdad neighborhood -and even if it has done so illegally, by refusing to order or even allow civilians to
evacuate, in order to use civilians as a shield -- the United States must still weigh the
military advantages of attacking against the probable cost of civilian deaths and
injuries.
The first principle is categorical, admitting of no exceptions. It leads in turn to a
cluster of specific, categorical requirements aimed at ensuring that noncombatants or
soldiers who are no longer in combat, like P.O.W.'s, are not attacked -- for example,
requirements that combatants wear uniforms or other identifying marks and carry
weapons openly. Although some of these categorical obligations have ambiguities --
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what qualifies as a uniform? -- and although evidence, interpretation and intent might
complicate matters, in principle they are either adhered to or not.
The second principle -- refraining from causing excessive collateral civilian damage -involves, by contrast, a weighing of costs and benefits and, making things still more
difficult, those costs and benefits as they might accrue in the future. Every day, every
night, Air Force lawyers and planners must consider possible targets and weigh what
they think the military value might be, in the future course of war, against the best
intelligence data on how many civilians might be killed or injured, or how much
civilian property destroyed. It is a thankless game of guesswork. By their nature, such
judgments involve factual evaluations and guesses that cannot be legally challenged,
unless something approximating willful, intentional gross negligence can be shown.
Gross negligence has to consist of more than a lot of collateral damage, including
gruesome civilian death and injury, that might be the result simply of a cruise missile
aimed in good faith but gone astray. Legal culpability cannot be determined simply by
looking at the level of damage and the death and injury caused. There is no moral
equivalence between stray missiles aimed in good faith, using the best technology
available, and deliberate violation of the categorical rules of war, like using human
shields, shelling civilians to prevent them from fleeing Basra and rape or summary
execution of prisoners. There can be no element of judgment, or weighing of costs
and benefits, in deciding whether or not to target civilians or take them hostage; it is
always wrong.
And yet. The reality remains for many that this moral distinction is sophistry. How
can it not be, when we see every day on television and in the newspapers (especially
non-American ones) so much death and injury to civilians? To speak of ''aiming'' at
one thing while simultaneously foreseeing that, in a sizable percentage of cases, you
would ''accidentally'' hit another -- if this is what ''rules'' of war consist of, then they
are no more than artificial salves on the consciences of combatants.
Moreover, it does seem to millions of people worldwide that there is indeed a moral
equivalence between the tactics of the Americans -- hitting targets from the air and
pleading collateral damage as a defense against responsibility -- and the tactics of the
Iraqis, who, lacking other means to attack, use their own civilians as a material and
moral resource, no matter what laws of war it might violate. This was the attitude, it
should be said, held by Churchill, who intended a scorched-earth defense of Britain
(including the use of poison gas) without much regard for the lives of British
civilians, should the invader ever arrive.
There is, I think, only one way to evaluate these conflicting claims. The idea of
''acceptable'' collateral damage is firmly embedded in Western legal and moral
thought, but in fact it is the product of a far more particular Christian strand of moral
thought than many of us, accustomed to the tradition, readily admit. The ''doctrine of
the double-effect,'' turning on a supposed moral difference between intended and
unintended but foreseeable consequences, is not morally obvious. It can be defended,
however, as a moral doctrine if we consider the alternatives. To deny the distinction
means that you either accept that virtual nonviolence is the only tenable position or
that you are indifferent to the lives of civilians, since you are guilty of anything that
happens anyway -- and in that case, anything becomes a target. The justification for
the principle of the double-effect is that it appears to be the only principled way of
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steering between a pacifism that few of us, in real life, would accept, and a brutal
realism that denies the moral necessity of even trying to distinguish between
combatants and noncombatants.
Even if you accept the principle of this distinction, however, it must be with a
knowledge that it is a compromise affair. It therefore puts a great moral burden on
those who fight to find better ways to separate civilians from fighters and to improve
the ability, through technology or other means, to aim and hit solely military targets.
And if war is, as the poet Rene Char wrote, ''this time of damned algebra,'' a matter of
endless calculation and recalculation of effects, then the law of war must take that into
account. It consists on the one hand of both categorical demands and prohibitions, and
on the other of calculations of cost and benefit, civilian loss and military advantage -and these calculations are always in flux.
The attempt to address these complexities and make law of them was undertaken by
United Nations negotiations in the 1970's. The 1977 Additional Protocol I grew out of
these negotiations. Although now ratified by some 160 nations with varying
''reservations'' (statements as to certain treaty articles a country does not accept as
binding), the United States has never ratified it (nor, it should be noted, has Iraq). Yet
without accepting the treaty as such, United States officials over the past 20 years
have indicated that the United States accepts various parts of the treaty without
accepting the whole. It remains a disappointment and a puzzle that the Department of
Defense has never been willing to state publicly and definitively which parts it
accepts and which parts it does not and why.
But the American problems with Protocol I generally fall into three main categories.
First, certain provisions are unacceptably political in nature. Jus in bello has always
insisted on exactly the same treatment for all sides in combat, the same rules whether
for the Allies or for the Germans, communists or capitalists. Protocol I, however,
grants combatants rights, including the vital right to be treated as a P.O.W., on the
basis of certain motives for fighting, referring specifically to those who fight against
''racist regimes'' (as in South Africa under apartheid) or ''alien occupation'' (as in
Israel).
Second, certain provisions appear to the United States to restrict methods and means
of warfare that it believes are legitimate. For example, Protocol I contains no
exceptions in its rules for nuclear weapons, while at the same time it categorically
prohibits reprisals against civilians, including the use of nuclear weapons in reprisal
for a nuclear attack, which is the basis for nuclear deterrence.
The third category of America's objections concerns rules in Protocol I that are aimed
at accommodating guerrillas and irregular fighters, as during the Vietnam War or in
Iraq. Unquestionably, these rules make life legally easier for irregular fighters, and
some would see this as making the rules of war more ''fair.'' Yet the rules also create
new risks for civilians. For example, the protocol grants legal combatant status even
to guerrillas who conceal themselves and their weapons among the civilian
population, as long as the fighters reveal themselves to the adversary ''preceding the
launching of an attack'' -- which is to say, often shortly before attacking from among
the civilians who will, inevitably, be caught in the crossfire. It is unfortunate for
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Saddam's irregulars that Iraq and the United States have not ratified the protocol, as it
would have provided legal protection for many of those fighters' attacks, if surely not
the civilians providing them with cover.
In addition, sections of Protocol I, while dealing with indiscriminate attacks -military operations that fail to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants -in detail, mention the obligations of defenders far more briefly. This is despite the fact
that the level of collateral damage incurred in military operations is often determined
by where the defender chooses to locate its military assets.
And so Amnesty International released a report last year on the actions of the Israeli
Defense Forces in Jenin that signally failed even to mention the legal obligations of
the Palestinian forces toward their own civilians. Human Rights Watch also issued an
entire report on Jenin that raised only in a few sentences the fact that Palestinian
fighters had situated themselves among civilians. (To Human Rights Watch's credit,
and perhaps in response to criticism, it has begun taking careful note of the
obligations of forces on the defensive as well as those of attackers.) And the
International Red Cross, in a message from its president at the commencement of the
Iraq war, called in general terms upon parties to observe the laws of war but dwelt
mainly upon attackers, the United States and Britain, neglecting to say anything
specific of the Iraqi defenders. But the inescapable fact is that the structure of
Protocol I practically invites such neglect.
The fact remains that every war is a petri dish for the next round of the laws of war.
And while the war in Iraq is principally about well-established legal principles, and
their violation, it, too, will end with a reconsideration of the laws dictating how war
should be waged.
For the past 20 years, the center of gravity in establishing, interpreting and shaping
the law of war has gradually shifted away from the military establishments of leading
states and their ''state practice.'' It has even shifted away from the International Red
Cross (invested by the Geneva Conventions with special authority) and toward more
activist and publicly aggressive N.G.O.'s -- including the ad hoc coalitions that
produced the Ottawa Treaty, banning land mines, and the new International Criminal
Court. These N.G.O.'s are indispensable in advancing the cause of humanitarianism in
war. But the pendulum shift toward them has gone further than is useful, and the
ownership of the laws of war needs to give much greater weight to the state practices
of leading countries. This does not mean that state practice is all that matters, nor does
it mean that all state practice matters -- Iraq, after all, is a state, and it is fighting, too - but it does mean that the state practice of democratic sovereigns that actually fight
wars should be ascendant in shaping the law. And this includes raising the standards
of the laws of war to reflect, for example, advances in technology and precision
weapons, standards that should become the norm for leading militaries, first for
NATO and then beyond.
N.G.O.'s are also wedded far too much to a procedural preference for the international
over the national. But that agenda increasingly amounts to internationalism for its
own sake, and its specific purpose is to constrain American sovereignty. It thus
promotes, embedded in an agenda of human rights and the laws of war, the ceding of
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sovereignty, even democratic sovereignty, as the most virtuous act that a state can
perform on behalf of its citizens. This agenda of privileging internationalism,
unfortunately, is even sometimes allowed to override obvious steps backward in the
laws of war, like privileging guerrilla combatants over the civilians in their midst. For
this reason, one consequence of the Iraq war for the future of the laws of war will
have to be an understanding that the solicitude of Protocol I for irregular fighters
hiding among civilians is wrong and that the United States was right to have rejected
it.
More broadly in recent years, the N.G.O.'s have been promoting an ever more utopian
law of war, in keeping with absolutist human rights ideology. In practice, alas, this
utopianism is aimed only at one side in conflicts -- the side that in fact tries to obey
the law. And so a second consequence of the war in Iraq for the future of the law of
war will have to be a halt to raising the standards ever higher for protecting the
civilian population when that burden effectively falls only on attacking forces,
unreciprocated. The status quo has the effect of rewarding defending forces for
recognizing that war crimes against their own civilians are the best strategy against a
powerful but scrupulous enemy. It risks in the end creating a law of war that assumes,
for all practical purposes, that the burden is all on one side, the side with the more
advanced technology and the less desperate military. After the last cruise missile has
been launched and the last irregular fighter silenced, we will look back on the war that
was wrought. What we will find is that the meaning of ''asymmetric'' warfare is not
what we thought. The issue is not so much disparities in technology. Instead, a form
of warfare has re-emerged that tacitly assumes, indeed permits, that the weaker side
must fight by using systematic violations of the law and its method. This is
unsustainable as a basis for the law of war. Reciprocity matters.
(Kenneth Anderson is a law professor at American University and a research
fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He is the legal editor of the
book ''Crimes of War.'' Email: kanders@wcl.american.edu.)
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